Ramon Felipe vs. Jose Leuterio

May 30, 1952 92 SCRA 482

Ponente: Justice Bengzon

Facts: On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate oratorical competition was held in Naga City. Felipe was one of the Judges and was the chairman. Nosce was awarded the first price and Imperial the second price. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the verdict and alleged that one of the judges committed a mathematical error on computing the scores. The Board refused to amend their award, Imperial filed a complaint in court. She asserts that she should have ranked 3^rd place in the vote, which makes her score 9 or the First place.

Issue: Whether the RTC reverse the decision of the board of judges to obtain a new award?

Held: Members of the court sometimes are members of the board of judges in an oratorical contest. But it is UNWRITTEN in the law that in such contests the decisions of the board of judges be final and cannot be appealed. The contestants do not have the right to the prizes because theirs is only a privilege to compete for the prize and did not become a demandable right. The respondent judge erred in his reasoning that where there is a wrong there is remedy. To quote “The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges. Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.”

GF Equity Inc, vs. Arturo Valenzona

June 30, 2005 462 SCRA 466

Ponente: Justice Carpio-Morales

Facts: GF Equity hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska team in Philippine Basketball Association under contract. Under the contract Valenzona will receive a monthly salary of P35,000, net of taxes, a service vehicle with gasoline allowance. Although, he had consulted his lawyer for the stipulations in the contract and was pointed by his counsel that there is an one-sidedness face still he agreed to the contract. Later on, he was terminated from being the Head Coach on grounds that the management believes he did not comply of all his duties as coach. Valenzona filed in RTC of Manila against the GF Equity of breach of contract with damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint stating that the contract was valid and that he is aware of the bad bargain. In the CA, where he appealed, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision and thus ordered HF Equity liable for damages. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the contract violated the rules on mutuality of contract resulting from breach of contract and therefore a recovery of damages can be awarded?

Held: The CA bases their judgment on Article 19 of the Civil Code, or the principle of abuse of rights. The same code also provides for the mutuality of contracts where both parties are bound and must adhere to the contract. The stipulation wherein, the management, on its sole opinion can terminate the employment of the defendant is violative and thus is null and void. GF Equity failed to consider the principle of abuse of right clearly stated in Article 19 of the CC. The pre-termination is anchored which is contrary to law and thereby abusing the right of Valenzona, entitles him of damages in consonance with Article 19 in relation to Article 20 of the CC. 

Consolidated Case Nakpil & Sons et. al. vs. Court of Appeals

October 3, 1986 160 SCRA 334

Ponented: Justice Paras

Facts: In the RTC of Manila, PBA filed a complaint for damages and thus was appealed to the CA where judgment was modified as what the RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff. PBA constructed a building whereby the construction was undertaken by United Construction Inc, (UCI). Approved by the president of PBA, the plans and specification were prepared by Nakpil & Sons. August 2, 1968, earthquake hit Manila and thus damaging properties where the building of PBA was one of which. November 29 of that same year, plaintiff PBA filed suit for recovery of damages against the UCI. The UCI in turned filed suit against Nakpil & Sons, by which in March 3, 1969 filed their written stipulation. In the RTC, technical issues were submitted to Commissioner Hizon and as for other issues the Court resolved. Commissioner sustained that the building was caused directly by the earthquake and maintained that the specification were not followed.

Issue(SC issue): Whether or not an Act of God-fortuitous event, exempts liability from parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence?

Held: Although the general rule for fortuitous events stated in Article 1174 of the Civil Code exempts liability when there is an Act of God, thus if in the concurrence of such event there be fraud, negligence, delay in the performance of the obligation, the obligor cannot escape liability therefore there can be an action for recovery of damages. The negligence of the defendant was shown when and proved that there was an alteration of the plans and specification that had been so stipulated among them. Therefore, therefore there should be no question that NAKPIL and UNITED are liable for damages because of the collapse of the building. 

Dominador Aytona vs. Andres Castillo

January 19, 1962 4SCRA 1

Ponente: CJ Bengzon

Facts: December 19, 1961, Aytona was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank and took oath and office on the same date. Noon of December 30, 1961 President elect D. Macapagal assumed office and subsequently on December 31, 1961 issued Order No. 2, cancelling all ad interim appointments made by the previous Chief of State. On the 1^st day of January 1962, Castillo was appointed by the incumbent president as Governor of Central Bank therefor replacing the ad interim appointee Aytona, and the former qualified immediately. Aytona instituted a qou warranto proceeding challenging the right of Castillo to exercise his right to the said post.

Issue: Whether or not the new president has the power to cancel all ad interim appointments made by the previous president after they have all qualified?

Held: To quote “We are informed, it is Malacañan's practice — which we find to be logical — to submit ad interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacañan submitted its appointments on the same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.” 

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines

October 22, 2007 537 SCRA 473

Ponente: Justice Corona

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery² in Bangkok, Thailand. Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. An order setting the case for initial hearing. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision⁴ in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.⁶ It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals⁷ rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Issues:

(Issue in the RTC and CA) sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Whether or not a person’s first name be change because of sex reassignment?

Whether or not entries in the B.C. be change on the basis of equity?

Held: Where the RTC affirms the petition filed by the herein petitioner, through the OSG, the republic appealed the case in the Court of Appeals, whereby the decision was set aside because there is no law that provides for the change of first name because of a sex reassignment. The SC rules out that the petition lacks merit where it was denied. The SC held that a person’s first name cannot be change because of sex reassignment and RA 9048 deliberately expounded on how a name can be change and sex reassignment is not one of them.  Furthermore, the SC held No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. It is but clear to state that a person’s status is determined at birth and not by reassignment. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 

Trusts: Cañezo vs Soledad G.R. No. 148788

Facts: Petitioner alleges she bought the land and only entrusted to her father for she left and went to Mindanao. In 1948 she found out that her step mother was in possession of the land. She filed for recovery and damages against defendant. It reached the court of appeals where the land was awarded to the defendant because there has been a satisfaction that the father of the petitioner was the owner.

Issue: Whether or not the action of the respondent filed out of time.

Held: Resolution of the issue hinges on the determination of trust - express or implied - by the petitioner and her father. Intention to create a trust cannot be inferred from the petitioner's testimony; the petitioner only testified to the effect that her agreement with her father was that she will be given a share in the produce of the property. Petitioner should not have made an issue in the declaration of taxes in her father's name if there really was trust. There was no trust that was established. Petitioner is estopped from asserting ownership by her failure to protest in the decision of the estate of her father. Her action is barred by laches.

Voidable Contracts: Teves vs PHHC G.R. No. L-21498

Facts: The complaint alleges that since October, 1950 plaintiff and her husband had been occupying Lot 9, Block K-70 of the Diliman Estate Subdivision (formerly known as the Quezon Memorial Grove), and they had built thereon their residential house with an assessed value of P3,250.00; that upon due investigation conducted sometime before August, 1951 the Chief of the Sales Division of the PHHC found plaintiff's husband to be the actual occupant of said land and having been found to be qualified to acquire said land by purchase it was recommended that the lot be sold to plaintiff's husband; that plaintiff's husband died on March 17, 1957, before the lot was actually sold to him, and so plaintiff, as successor in interest of her husband, filed an application in her own name to purchase the lot in question; that thereafter plaintiff made repeated and insistent requests and representations with the officials and personnel of the Sales Division of the PHHC to process and forward her application to the Board of Directors of the PHHC for approval, but said officials and personnel ignored the requests and representations of the plaintiff; that instead of respecting plaintiff's preferential right, and in spite of the fact that the officials and personnel of the PHHC knew that plaintiff was the actual occupant of the lot, and without giving notice to the plaintiff that a party was applying to purchase the same lot, the PHHC sold the same lot to defendant Melisenda L. Santos who applied for it only on February 23, 1961 through an agent; that on January 12, 1962, a deed of sale of the lot — with the full balance actually paid — was executed, and shortly thereafter, or on January 23, 1962, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 95976 covering the lot was issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in favor of said defendant. The complaint contains allegations that the plaintiff was fraudulently deprived of her preferential right to buy the lot in question, and that defendant Melisenda L. Santos was able to secure the approval of her application to purchase the lot and the execution of the deed of sale in her favor through the help of an influential politician.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff has a cause of action to annul the contract.

Held: A perusal of the complaint would elicit the position of the plaintiff in her case against the defendants, to wit: she had a right which she had acquired pursuant to the very policy promulgated by the defendant PHHC; she was deprived of the enjoyment of right when defendant PHHC sold the lot in question to defendant Melisenda L. Santos who was never an occupant of the lot and who applied to purchase said lot through an agent much later; the sale of the lot to the defendant Melisenda L. Santos was made without her knowledge, much less with her consent, and was in violation of the policy of the PHHC, so that the sale should not be given effect. the plaintiff is seeking the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale not as a party in the deed, or because she is obliged principally or subsidiarily under the deed, but because she has an interest that is affected by the deed. This Court has held that a person who is not a party obliged principally or subsidiarily in a contract may exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudice in his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can show the detriment which would positively result to him from the contract in which he had no intervention.

Rescissible Contracts: Oria vs McMicking G.R. No. L-7003

Facts: Gutierrez Hermanos filed an action for recovery of a sum of money against Oria Hermanos & Co. and herein plaintiff filed an action for recovery also for the same defendant. Before the institution of the suits, members of the Company dissolved their relations and entered into a liquidation. Tomas Oria y Balbas acting in behalf of his co-owners entered into a contract with the herein plaintiff for the purpose of transferring and selling all the property which the Oria Hermanos & Co. owned and among the goods stated on that instrument was the steamship Serpantes and which the subject of this litigation. When the Trail Court resolved the action for recovery filed by Gutierrez Hermanos and jugdment was in his favor, The sheriff demanded to Tomas Oria y Balbas to make payment but the latter said there were no funds to pay the same. The sheriff then levied on the steamer, took possession of the same and announced it for public auction. Herein plaintiff claimed that he is the owner of the steamer by virtue of the selling of all the properties of the said Company.

Issue(s): 1. Whether or not there was a valid sale between Oria Hermanos & Co. to Manuel Oria y Gonzales as against the creditors of the company.

2. Whether or not the sale was fraudulent.

Held: At the time of said sale the value of the assets of Oria Hermanos & Co., as stated by the partners themselves, was P274,000. The vendee of said sale was a son of Tomas Oria y Balbas and a nephew of the other two persons heretofore mentioned which said three brothers together constituted all of the members of said company.The plaintiff is a young man of 25 years old and has no property before the said selling. The court had laid down the rules in determining whether a there has been fraud prejudicing creditors: 1) consideration of conveyance is fictitious; 2) transfer was made while the suit against him (Tomas Oria y Balbas) was pending; 3) sale by insolvent debtor; 4) evidence of insolvency; 5) transfer of all properties; 6) the sale was made between father and son; 7) and the failure of the vendee to take exclusive possession of the property. The case at bar shows every one of the badges of fraud.