Pastor Tenchaves vs. Vicenta Escaño

November 29, 1965 122 SCRA 752

Ponente: Justice Reyes

Facts: Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register. Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta was not allowed to see Pastor and therefore they became estranged, Vicenta then went to Misamis Occidental and later on went abroad and somehow had lived there and where she file an absolute divorce against her husband. Tenchaves filed in Cebu RTC for relief and even accusing the parents of his wife of alienating the affection of his wife which caused the separation between the couple.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Vicenta and Pastor valid?

Whether or not damages may be recovered of the aggrieved party?

Held: The Court held that Pastor and Vincenta’s marriage was valid because the essential requisites for marriage was duly complied with by both parties although the circumstances that had occurred prevented their union as husband and wife. Therefore, it must concluded that under Philippine laws the divorce filed by Vicenta was of no value and thus her second marriage become bigamous and is not valid in our jurisdiction. The Court afforded for the plaintiff a decree of legal separation is but a rightful remedy, the filing of the defendant a divorce is an evidence of their subsisting marriage. While on the issue of damages, the defendant has a right to recover damages from the defendant but the parents of the defendant must be absolved for they were not participative of the acts committed by their daughter, they were even the ones who would want a recelebration of marriage. 

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines

October 22, 2007 537 SCRA 473

Ponente: Justice Corona

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery² in Bangkok, Thailand. Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. An order setting the case for initial hearing. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision⁴ in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.⁶ It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals⁷ rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Issues:

(Issue in the RTC and CA) sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Whether or not a person’s first name be change because of sex reassignment?

Whether or not entries in the B.C. be change on the basis of equity?

Held: Where the RTC affirms the petition filed by the herein petitioner, through the OSG, the republic appealed the case in the Court of Appeals, whereby the decision was set aside because there is no law that provides for the change of first name because of a sex reassignment. The SC rules out that the petition lacks merit where it was denied. The SC held that a person’s first name cannot be change because of sex reassignment and RA 9048 deliberately expounded on how a name can be change and sex reassignment is not one of them.  Furthermore, the SC held No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. It is but clear to state that a person’s status is determined at birth and not by reassignment. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. 

Cui vs Arellano University

GR No. L-15127


Facts: The petitioner was a law student in the respondent university and was a scholar in the said university therefore he did not pay his tuition because of his scholarship grant. When he was reaching his 4th year, to follow where his uncle, former Dean of the College of Law in the respondent University transferred to another school, petitioner felt the need to transfer and leave the respondent University. After graduating and he was about to take the Bar exams, he was obtaining his Transcript of records from the respondent university where the university is collecting from him the total amount of his tuition because he transferred, therefore the University is asking for the payment. Director of Private Schools issued a Memorandum, where on the second paragraph clearly stated that scholarship grants need not to be reimbursed when a granted student transfer. The respondent University alleged that the Memorandum be declared null and void.




Issue(s): Whether the contract entered by the petitioner and respondent void?




Held: The Court in in lieu with the lower court in saying that it in the affirmative. Thus, The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. 
                 

People vs Pimentedl

G.R. No. 100210.  April 1, 1998


Facts: In 1983, Tujan was charged with possession of illegal firearms and in 1990 he was once again charged of the same and was posed with no bail. The counsel of the defendant then filed a motion to quash the case where the petitioner opposed standing that Tujan was not in double jeopardy. Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and (2) it was deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case against private respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789.




Issue: Whether the respondent court erred in not applying the accord law and jurisprudence?




Held: The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for violation of  P.D. No. 1866 filed against private respondent Antonio Tujan. The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous. 

Aguillon vs Director of Lands Case Digest

G.R. No. L-5448 December 16, 1910


Facts: Severo Aguillon, the petitioner, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain parcels of land described in the said petition. the Attorney-General, representing the Insular Government, opposed the registration of the parcels of land in question, upon the theory that the said land belonged to the Government. At the time of the trial of the cause the Director of Lands amended his opposition to the registration of the parcels of land in question, alleging that the plans presented by the petitioner had not been prepared in conformity with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 1875 of the Philippine Agriculture. The appellee contends that, inasmuch as his plans had been prepared long before the enactment of the said Act No. 1875, the same was not applicable, for the reason that to make the law applicable to the present case would be giving to said law a retroactive effect, and cites article 3 of the Civil Code


Issue: Whether the Republic Act in question applies to the case of the petitioner?




Held: In our opinion the law does not have a retroactive effect. It only applied to cases which were begun in the Court of Land Registration after its enactment. It is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights. The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and stand reversed until with the provisions of Act No. 1875, and the case is hereby ordered to be returned to the lower court with direction that the petitioner present his plans in accordance with said Act.


Aguillon vs Director of Lands Digest

Castro vs Sagales Case Digest

G.R. No. L-6359        




Facts: Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to this Supreme Court. Before the passage of said Act demands for compensation had to be submitted to the regular courts. The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of plaintiff Carmen Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and action having been commenced in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in August, 1952 .1 For the appellants, it is contended that the date of the accident, and not the date of filing the complaint, should be considered because the right to compensation of the laborer or employees or his dependents, like the obligation of the employer to pay the same, begins from the very moment of the accident.


Issue: the resultant issue is the proper forum: either the courts or the Workmen's Compensation Commission


Held: It is true that the right arises from the moment of the accident, but such right must be declared or confirmed by the government agency empowered by law to make the declaration. Republic Act No. 772 is very clear that on and after June 20, 1952 all claims for compensation shall be decided exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having been formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction, at that time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be interposed to the application of the law conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission, because the statute does not thereby operate retroactively; it is made to operate upon claims formulated after the law's approval. 

Laureano vs CA

GR No. G.R. No. 114776


Facts: Petitioner was released from employment because of the employer's cost-cutting measure because it was hit by a recession. Aggrieved party(Singapore Airlines) contended that the case cannot be heard and that the Philippines courts has no jurisdiction on the said matter. 


Issue: Whether the Philippines has jurisdiction on the said case?


Held: The court agreed on the decision of lower courts that Philippine courts has jurisdiction considering that the Singaporean Laws did not specifically point out what law to be applied and thus the Philippines assumed jurisdiction.