GR No. L-15127
Facts: The petitioner was a law student in the respondent university and was a scholar in the said university therefore he did not pay his tuition because of his scholarship grant. When he was reaching his 4th year, to follow where his uncle, former Dean of the College of Law in the respondent University transferred to another school, petitioner felt the need to transfer and leave the respondent University. After graduating and he was about to take the Bar exams, he was obtaining his Transcript of records from the respondent university where the university is collecting from him the total amount of his tuition because he transferred, therefore the University is asking for the payment. Director of Private Schools issued a Memorandum, where on the second paragraph clearly stated that scholarship grants need not to be reimbursed when a granted student transfer. The respondent University alleged that the Memorandum be declared null and void.
Issue(s): Whether the contract entered by the petitioner and respondent void?
Held: The Court in in lieu with the lower court in saying that it in the affirmative. Thus, The
nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personal
equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane.
Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum
No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation
in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The
aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy.
Tuesday, June 26, 2012
People vs Pimentedl
G.R.
No. 100210. April 1, 1998
Facts: In 1983, Tujan was charged with possession of illegal firearms and in 1990 he was once again charged of the same and was posed with no bail. The counsel of the defendant then filed a motion to quash the case where the petitioner opposed standing that Tujan was not in double jeopardy. Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and (2) it was deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case against private respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789.
Issue: Whether the respondent court erred in not applying the accord law and jurisprudence?
Held: The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for violation of P.D. No. 1866 filed against private respondent Antonio Tujan. The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
Facts: In 1983, Tujan was charged with possession of illegal firearms and in 1990 he was once again charged of the same and was posed with no bail. The counsel of the defendant then filed a motion to quash the case where the petitioner opposed standing that Tujan was not in double jeopardy. Petitioner now comes to this Court, claiming that: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accord with the law and applicable jurisprudence; and (2) it was deprived of due process to prosecute and prove its case against private respondent Antonio Tujan in Criminal Case No. 1789.
Issue: Whether the respondent court erred in not applying the accord law and jurisprudence?
Held: The Court of Appeals considered as duplicitous the Information for violation of P.D. No. 1866 filed against private respondent Antonio Tujan. The ruling of the Court of Appeals is erroneous.
Aguillon vs Director of Lands Case Digest
G.R. No. L-5448 December 16, 1910
Facts: Severo Aguillon, the petitioner, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of certain parcels of land described in the said petition. the Attorney-General, representing the Insular Government, opposed the registration of the parcels of land in question, upon the theory that the said land belonged to the Government. At the time of the trial of the cause the Director of Lands amended his opposition to the registration of the parcels of land in question, alleging that the plans presented by the petitioner had not been prepared in conformity with the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 1875 of the Philippine Agriculture. The appellee contends that, inasmuch as his plans had been prepared long before the enactment of the said Act No. 1875, the same was not applicable, for the reason that to make the law applicable to the present case would be giving to said law a retroactive effect, and cites article 3 of the Civil Code
Issue: Whether the Republic Act in question applies to the case of the petitioner?
Held: In our opinion the law does not have a retroactive effect. It only applied to cases which were begun in the Court of Land Registration after its enactment. It is a doctrine well established that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once, so long as it does not affect or change vested rights. The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and stand reversed until with the provisions of Act No. 1875, and the case is hereby ordered to be returned to the lower court with direction that the petitioner present his plans in accordance with said Act.
Aguillon vs Director of Lands Digest
Castro vs Sagales Case Digest
G.R. No.
L-6359
Facts: Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to this Supreme Court. Before the passage of said Act demands for compensation had to be submitted to the regular courts. The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of plaintiff Carmen Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and action having been commenced in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in August, 1952 .1 For the appellants, it is contended that the date of the accident, and not the date of filing the complaint, should be considered because the right to compensation of the laborer or employees or his dependents, like the obligation of the employer to pay the same, begins from the very moment of the accident.
Issue: the resultant issue is the proper forum: either the courts or the Workmen's Compensation Commission
Held: It is true that the right arises from the moment of the accident, but such right must be declared or confirmed by the government agency empowered by law to make the declaration. Republic Act No. 772 is very clear that on and after June 20, 1952 all claims for compensation shall be decided exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having been formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction, at that time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be interposed to the application of the law conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission, because the statute does not thereby operate retroactively; it is made to operate upon claims formulated after the law's approval.
Facts: Republic Act No. 772 effective June 20, 1952 conferred upon the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to this Supreme Court. Before the passage of said Act demands for compensation had to be submitted to the regular courts. The fatal accident which befell Dioscoro Cruz, husband of plaintiff Carmen Cruz, having occurred in January 1952 and action having been commenced in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan in August, 1952 .1 For the appellants, it is contended that the date of the accident, and not the date of filing the complaint, should be considered because the right to compensation of the laborer or employees or his dependents, like the obligation of the employer to pay the same, begins from the very moment of the accident.
Issue: the resultant issue is the proper forum: either the courts or the Workmen's Compensation Commission
Held: It is true that the right arises from the moment of the accident, but such right must be declared or confirmed by the government agency empowered by law to make the declaration. Republic Act No. 772 is very clear that on and after June 20, 1952 all claims for compensation shall be decided exclusively by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court. This claim having been formulated for the first time in August,1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the latter had no jurisdiction, at that time, to act upon it. No constitutional objection may be interposed to the application of the law conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission, because the statute does not thereby operate retroactively; it is made to operate upon claims formulated after the law's approval.
Laureano vs CA
GR No. G.R.
No. 114776
Facts: Petitioner was released from employment because of the employer's cost-cutting measure because it was hit by a recession. Aggrieved party(Singapore Airlines) contended that the case cannot be heard and that the Philippines courts has no jurisdiction on the said matter.
Issue: Whether the Philippines has jurisdiction on the said case?
Held: The court agreed on the decision of lower courts that Philippine courts has jurisdiction considering that the Singaporean Laws did not specifically point out what law to be applied and thus the Philippines assumed jurisdiction.
Facts: Petitioner was released from employment because of the employer's cost-cutting measure because it was hit by a recession. Aggrieved party(Singapore Airlines) contended that the case cannot be heard and that the Philippines courts has no jurisdiction on the said matter.
Issue: Whether the Philippines has jurisdiction on the said case?
Held: The court agreed on the decision of lower courts that Philippine courts has jurisdiction considering that the Singaporean Laws did not specifically point out what law to be applied and thus the Philippines assumed jurisdiction.
Phil Int'l Trading Copr vs Judge Angeles Case Digest
G.R.
No. 108461. October 21,
1996
Facts: Petitioners seeks to reverse a decision rendered by the herein respondent Judge, declaring null and void and unconstitutional the petitioner's administrative order.
Facts: Petitioners seeks to reverse a decision rendered by the herein respondent Judge, declaring null and void and unconstitutional the petitioner's administrative order.
Monday, June 25, 2012
Pesigan vs Angeles Case Digest
Facts: Anselmo L. Pesigan and
Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck
in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot,
Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas. In spite of the permit to
transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing at Basud,
Camarines Norte, were confiscated and The confiscation was basis
on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A, and in pursuant to the order, distributed the carabaos
among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the Vinzons municipal
nursery. The Pesigans then filed an action to recover the carabaos and sue for damages. Judge Domingo Medina
Angeles who heard the case dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
Issue: Whether the said Executive Order applies to the Pesigans?
Held: The Court agrees that said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
Issue: Whether the said Executive Order applies to the Pesigans?
Held: The Court agrees that said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
People vs Que Po Lay Case Digest
G.R. No. L-6791
Facts: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20. The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange failed to sell to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. He appeals basing on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect.
Issues: Whether there was a need for a publication of the said circular to make it effective?
Whether the respondent is guilty of violating the said Circular 20?
Held: The Court agrees that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect.
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. The Court further contends that appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
Facts: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20. The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange failed to sell to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. He appeals basing on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect.
Issues: Whether there was a need for a publication of the said circular to make it effective?
Whether the respondent is guilty of violating the said Circular 20?
Held: The Court agrees that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect.
Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. The Court further contends that appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
TAÑADA vs TUVERA Case Digest
Persons and Family Relation G.R. No. L-63915 :
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Issues: Whether the petitioners have legal personality to bring the instant petition?
Whether publication is needed to make the law effective?
Held: Clearly, the right sought
to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. Court has ruled that publication
in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation
itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides
for the date when it goes into effect. Considered in the light of
other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." That duty must be enforced
if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of
what should be published in the Official Gazette. The publication of all presidential issuances
"of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or.
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Basa vs Mercado Case Digest
Persons and Family Relations GR No. L- 42226 :
Facts: Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. On January 30, 1932, the same judge approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the administration proceedings. On April 11, 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing. The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
Issues: Whether the 21 days requirement for publication be followed pursuant to the sec. 630 of Code of Civil Procedure?
Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper considered a newspaper of general circulation?
Held: In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing. The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made inIng Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.
Facts: Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. On January 30, 1932, the same judge approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the administration proceedings. On April 11, 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing. The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
Issues: Whether the 21 days requirement for publication be followed pursuant to the sec. 630 of Code of Civil Procedure?
Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper considered a newspaper of general circulation?
Held: In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing. The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made inIng Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.
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