Francisco Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: Complainant Soledad Cagigas then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.  She gave up teaching and opt to become a life insurance underwriter in Cebu City where the relationship of him and petitioner and that they have sexual relations. The petitioner promised to marry  Cagigas and that they have borne a child Chris Hermosisima. Subsequently on July 24, 1954, Francisco married Romanita Perez.

Issue: Whether or not mere breach of promise to marry is actionable?

Held: It has been ruled for many cases that promise to marry is not actionable. The Civil Code does not provide for such. The decision of the RTC was eliminated by the SC.

Sergio Amonoy vs. Spouses Jose and Angela Gutierrez

February 15, 2001 351 SCRA 73

Ponente: Justice Panganiban

Facts: The case springs from Special Proceedings of estate of Julio Cantolos. Amonoy was the counsel of the intestate. The attorney’s fee charged was P27,000.00 and 2 of the intestate, Asuncion Pasamba and Alonso Formilda executed a real estate mortgage of the 2 parcels of land adjudicated for them in favor of Amonoy to secure the said attorney’s fee. It was only on August 6, 1969 when the taxes are paid, claims are settles and properties adjudicated, the real estate was declared closed and terminated. Amonoy filed a civil case because he was not paid, but the fees were decreased. On September 1972, judgment was in favor of Amonoy ordering the heirs to pay within 90 days and if not 2 lots will be sold for public auction. Amonoy was the highest bidder and included were the lot where the house of the Gutierrez’s was built. On September 1985 twin motions were filed and a TRO was issued. The decision of the SC was promulgated but the house was already demolished. A complaint for damages were filed in the RTC, dismissed the suit. On appeal to the CA, the RTC was set aside and ordering the petitioner  to pay.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages?

Held: This case cannot be one of those cases that held “damnum absque injuria.”  Clearly then, the demolition of respondents’ house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right.  In insisting on his alleged right, he wantonly violated this Court’s Order and wittingly caused the destruction of respondents’ house. 

Beatriz Wassmer vs. Francisco Velez

December 26, 1964 129 SCRA 1440

Ponente: Justice Bengzon

Facts: Petitioner and respondent planned to get married but 3 days before the day of the ceremony, the respondent flew to his hometown in Cagayan de Oro City in Mindanao and left his bride to be a letter that their marriage be cancelled because his mother opposes such and even instructing her to keep his withdrawal from marriage discreet to avoid scandal. But the next day another telegram was sent by the respondent saying that their marriage will continue but the groom failed to appear. Petitioner files for an action for damages and there being no answer from the other party it was held on default. The defendant moved for reconsideration but the court ordered them to appear before the court where the defendant failed to appear. The defendant alleged that the case involves a mere breach of promise to marry which is not an actionable wrong.

Issue: Whether or not the case involves a mere breach of promise to marry?

Whether or not damages can be recovered by the aggrieved party?

Held: This case does NOT involve a mere breach of promise to marry because there were already publicity, invitations have been delivered, the dress was already paid and all the preparations were already set therefore there is really intent to marry. And in accordance to Article 21 of the Civil Code, one can recover damages because the defendant’s action is contrary to good customs. 

Ramon Felipe vs. Jose Leuterio

May 30, 1952 92 SCRA 482

Ponente: Justice Bengzon

Facts: On March 12, 1950 an inter-collegiate oratorical competition was held in Naga City. Felipe was one of the Judges and was the chairman. Nosce was awarded the first price and Imperial the second price. Imperial addressed a letter to the Board of Judges protesting the verdict and alleged that one of the judges committed a mathematical error on computing the scores. The Board refused to amend their award, Imperial filed a complaint in court. She asserts that she should have ranked 3^rd place in the vote, which makes her score 9 or the First place.

Issue: Whether the RTC reverse the decision of the board of judges to obtain a new award?

Held: Members of the court sometimes are members of the board of judges in an oratorical contest. But it is UNWRITTEN in the law that in such contests the decisions of the board of judges be final and cannot be appealed. The contestants do not have the right to the prizes because theirs is only a privilege to compete for the prize and did not become a demandable right. The respondent judge erred in his reasoning that where there is a wrong there is remedy. To quote “The flaw in his reasoning lies in the assumption that Imperial suffered some wrong at the hands of the board of judges. If at all, there was error on the part of one judge, at most. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. As stated before, a contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared winner by the board of referees or judges. Granting that Imperial suffered some loss or injury, yet in law there are instances of "damnum absque injuria". This is one of them. If fraud or malice had been proven, it would be a different proposition. But then her action should be directed against the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.”

GF Equity Inc, vs. Arturo Valenzona

June 30, 2005 462 SCRA 466

Ponente: Justice Carpio-Morales

Facts: GF Equity hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska team in Philippine Basketball Association under contract. Under the contract Valenzona will receive a monthly salary of P35,000, net of taxes, a service vehicle with gasoline allowance. Although, he had consulted his lawyer for the stipulations in the contract and was pointed by his counsel that there is an one-sidedness face still he agreed to the contract. Later on, he was terminated from being the Head Coach on grounds that the management believes he did not comply of all his duties as coach. Valenzona filed in RTC of Manila against the GF Equity of breach of contract with damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint stating that the contract was valid and that he is aware of the bad bargain. In the CA, where he appealed, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision and thus ordered HF Equity liable for damages. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the contract violated the rules on mutuality of contract resulting from breach of contract and therefore a recovery of damages can be awarded?

Held: The CA bases their judgment on Article 19 of the Civil Code, or the principle of abuse of rights. The same code also provides for the mutuality of contracts where both parties are bound and must adhere to the contract. The stipulation wherein, the management, on its sole opinion can terminate the employment of the defendant is violative and thus is null and void. GF Equity failed to consider the principle of abuse of right clearly stated in Article 19 of the CC. The pre-termination is anchored which is contrary to law and thereby abusing the right of Valenzona, entitles him of damages in consonance with Article 19 in relation to Article 20 of the CC. 

Consolidated Case Nakpil & Sons et. al. vs. Court of Appeals

October 3, 1986 160 SCRA 334

Ponented: Justice Paras

Facts: In the RTC of Manila, PBA filed a complaint for damages and thus was appealed to the CA where judgment was modified as what the RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiff. PBA constructed a building whereby the construction was undertaken by United Construction Inc, (UCI). Approved by the president of PBA, the plans and specification were prepared by Nakpil & Sons. August 2, 1968, earthquake hit Manila and thus damaging properties where the building of PBA was one of which. November 29 of that same year, plaintiff PBA filed suit for recovery of damages against the UCI. The UCI in turned filed suit against Nakpil & Sons, by which in March 3, 1969 filed their written stipulation. In the RTC, technical issues were submitted to Commissioner Hizon and as for other issues the Court resolved. Commissioner sustained that the building was caused directly by the earthquake and maintained that the specification were not followed.

Issue(SC issue): Whether or not an Act of God-fortuitous event, exempts liability from parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence?

Held: Although the general rule for fortuitous events stated in Article 1174 of the Civil Code exempts liability when there is an Act of God, thus if in the concurrence of such event there be fraud, negligence, delay in the performance of the obligation, the obligor cannot escape liability therefore there can be an action for recovery of damages. The negligence of the defendant was shown when and proved that there was an alteration of the plans and specification that had been so stipulated among them. Therefore, therefore there should be no question that NAKPIL and UNITED are liable for damages because of the collapse of the building. 

Dominador Aytona vs. Andres Castillo

January 19, 1962 4SCRA 1

Ponente: CJ Bengzon

Facts: December 19, 1961, Aytona was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank and took oath and office on the same date. Noon of December 30, 1961 President elect D. Macapagal assumed office and subsequently on December 31, 1961 issued Order No. 2, cancelling all ad interim appointments made by the previous Chief of State. On the 1^st day of January 1962, Castillo was appointed by the incumbent president as Governor of Central Bank therefor replacing the ad interim appointee Aytona, and the former qualified immediately. Aytona instituted a qou warranto proceeding challenging the right of Castillo to exercise his right to the said post.

Issue: Whether or not the new president has the power to cancel all ad interim appointments made by the previous president after they have all qualified?

Held: To quote “We are informed, it is Malacañan's practice — which we find to be logical — to submit ad interim appointments only when the Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacañan submitted its appointments on the same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a result, as already adverted to, some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.” 

PNB vs. CA

Facts: A certain Rita Tapnio (Mrs. Tapnio) was indebted to the petitioner Bank with the amount of P2,000. A bond was executed by the Petitioner and the defendant as principal to guarantee such debt. Demands were sent to defendant but she believed of not having a debt to the Bank because an agreement between him and Mr. Tuazon, the excess sugar quota will be leased, was noted by the said Bank thus Mrs. Tapnio filed for damages in that case. The Bank posits that having a lien on the crops harvested by Mrs. Tapnio, they can collect from her. Mr. Tuazon who agrees to the lease, which could have absolved Mrs. Tapnio from her debt to the Bank, later on communicated his withdrawal from the agreement because the bank would not consider that the rental will be in P2.80 per picul because they would want a P13.00 per picul, which the parties were not notified by the bank.  The RTC granted the defendant Mrs. Tapnio awards for damages against the Bank that led to appeal which the CA denied the petition, came this petition in the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the Bank is held liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code?

Held: To quote the SC, “While petitioner had the ultimate authority of approving or disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to the Bank, the latter certainly cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the protection of the interest of private respondents, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving or disapproving the lease of said sugar quota.” Because the Bank failed to convey their non-consideration of the lease price to the defendant, it showed their lack of diligence, and did not comply on the provision of Article 21 of the Civil Code which in turn held them liable for damages.

RCPI vs. CA

Facts: 24^th of January 1983 private respondent spouses sent a telegram of condolence to their cousins through the herein petioner RCPI. The telegram was in perfect resemblance as to what was intended by the spouses however, it was written on a birthday card and was sealed in on a “Christmasgram” envelope.  The spouses contended there was a breach of contract on the part of the RCPI, they in turn filed complaint on the trial court where it rendered its decision in favor of the spouses whereas, it was appealed in the CA where also the judgment in the lower court was affirmed in toto. Thus, the RCPI came to this Court for relief contending issues that the CA erred in rendering such judgment.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner committed a breach of contract?

Whether or not the RCPI are held liable for damages?

Held: The Court agrees with the appellate court in its decision and per endorsement of the trial court’s findings that the RCPI as a corporation dealing with telecommunication are engaged in public interest and therefore rests in their shoulders an obligation to serve the public with care and without negligence. The reason of shortage in their production of the appropriate envelope is of no value to merit for it is their duty to have produced such. The negligence committed is evidentially sufficient to recover damages because the spouses suffered from ridicule amongst the people who have come to have knowledge of such activity. 

Albetz Investment Inc., vs. CA

February 28, 1977 75 SCRA 310

Ponente: Justice Antonio

Facts: This is an action for damages caused to the plaintiffs' properties due to the alleged indiscriminate, negligent, and wanton demolition of the house of the plaintiffs when the sheriff served the writ of execution issued by the Municipal Court. Spouses were the lessees of that lot  No. 27 pt., Block No. BP-52 of a subdivision plan and located No. 816 Prudencio Street, Sampaloc, Manila.  Albetz Investments, Inc., the lessor, needing the premises in order to construct a new building, demanded delivery of the lot to it and upon refusal of of the Calma Spouses, Albetz Investments, Inc. brought an action of unlawful detainer against Vicenta Calma. Vicenta Calma and others filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction on September 7, 1964 in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Alleging that the demolition was illegal because it was made eight (8) months after issuance of the demolition order, and that the manner it was carried out was indiscriminate, causing damage to their personal properties, the spouses Calma, owners of the house, and the spouses Umengan, occupants of its ground floor, commenced the instant action in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On the principal grounds that the order of demolition was no longer in force, having been issued eight (8) months before its enforcement, and that the said spouses were not notified of the order of demolition, and they demolished the house indiscrimately and the personal properties were carelessly placed, resulting in their being damaged, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, awarding them damages in specified amounts, as well as attorney's fees and costs of suit. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s): Whether or not there can be a recovery of damage in consonance with Article 19 of the Civil Code?

Held: We find, on the basis of the records, that the Calma spouses could not have been unaware of the order of demolition prior to the date when their house was actually demolished.  It is apparent, therefore, that the Calma spouses were given more than sufficient time to comply with the order of the Municipal Court to remove voluntarily their house from the premises. It is not even necessary to await the order of demolition to be served upon the said spouses before carrying out the writ of demolition. Certainly, the demolition complained of in the case at bar was not carried out in a manner consistent with justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving the occupants of the house no time at all to remove their belongings therefrom. No damage worth mentioning would have been sustained by petitioner Albetz Investments, Inc. if their men, led by the Sheriff, had been instructed to allow said occupants to remove their personal properties, considering that this would not have taken a considerable length of time.

Pastor Tenchaves vs. Vicenta Escaño

November 29, 1965 122 SCRA 752

Ponente: Justice Reyes

Facts: Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register. Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta was not allowed to see Pastor and therefore they became estranged, Vicenta then went to Misamis Occidental and later on went abroad and somehow had lived there and where she file an absolute divorce against her husband. Tenchaves filed in Cebu RTC for relief and even accusing the parents of his wife of alienating the affection of his wife which caused the separation between the couple.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Vicenta and Pastor valid?

Whether or not damages may be recovered of the aggrieved party?

Held: The Court held that Pastor and Vincenta’s marriage was valid because the essential requisites for marriage was duly complied with by both parties although the circumstances that had occurred prevented their union as husband and wife. Therefore, it must concluded that under Philippine laws the divorce filed by Vicenta was of no value and thus her second marriage become bigamous and is not valid in our jurisdiction. The Court afforded for the plaintiff a decree of legal separation is but a rightful remedy, the filing of the defendant a divorce is an evidence of their subsisting marriage. While on the issue of damages, the defendant has a right to recover damages from the defendant but the parents of the defendant must be absolved for they were not participative of the acts committed by their daughter, they were even the ones who would want a recelebration of marriage. 

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic of the Philippines

October 22, 2007 537 SCRA 473

Ponente: Justice Corona

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery² in Bangkok, Thailand. Petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. An order setting the case for initial hearing. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision⁴ in favor of petitioner. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.⁶ It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals⁷ rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.

Issues:

(Issue in the RTC and CA) sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Whether or not a person’s first name be change because of sex reassignment?

Whether or not entries in the B.C. be change on the basis of equity?

Held: Where the RTC affirms the petition filed by the herein petitioner, through the OSG, the republic appealed the case in the Court of Appeals, whereby the decision was set aside because there is no law that provides for the change of first name because of a sex reassignment. The SC rules out that the petition lacks merit where it was denied. The SC held that a person’s first name cannot be change because of sex reassignment and RA 9048 deliberately expounded on how a name can be change and sex reassignment is not one of them.  Furthermore, the SC held No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment. It is but clear to state that a person’s status is determined at birth and not by reassignment. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.